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Abstract
The literature suggests that the concern for economic eﬃciency calls for
individual-based taxation of married couples with a higher rate on the pri-
mary earner. This paper reconsiders the choice of tax unit in the Becker
model of household production. Our aim is to study the robustness of previ-
ous results to the modelling of time allocation. In addition, we analyze the
interaction between the optimal income tax for couples and the chosen com-
modity tax structure. In the absence of restrictions on the use of commodity
taxes, eﬃcient taxation requires joint taxation of the family. In the presence
of restricted commodity taxation, the income tax should compensate for the
erroneous commodity taxes. In this case, individual taxation is typically op-
timal, but not necessarily with a higher rate on primary earners as usually
suggested. (JEL H21, D13, J22)
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for helpful comments. The activities of EPRU (Economic Policy Research Unit) are supported
by a grant from the Danish National Research Foundation. Address for correspondence: Hen-
rik Jacobsen Kleven, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, DK-
1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark. Phone: +45 35 32 44 15, fax: +45 35 32 30 00, e-mail: Hen-
rik.Kleven@econ.ku.dk.1 Introduction
Whether married couples should be subject to joint or individual ﬁling has been
a debating point throughout the existence of the income tax. Since the papers by
Rosen (1977) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), an eﬃciency argument for individ-
ual taxation has been widely accepted. In this paper, we consider the robustness of
their argument to the introduction of household production in the analysis.
The argument for individual taxation starts with the empirical observation that
the labor supply of primary earners is less elastic than that of secondary earners.
Traditional Ramsey considerations call for a higher tax rate on the less elastic tax
base, implying that the income of primary earners should carry a relatively high rate
of tax. One way of achieving this goal in a system of progressive income taxation,
since the primary earner have a higher income, is to let the two members of the
household ﬁle individually. By contrast, in a system of (fully) joint taxation, the
marginal tax rates for the two spouses are identical so that the distortionary eﬀects
on aggregate labor supply become larger.
Despite the important role of labor supply for the above result, little attention
has been paid to the model of labor supply on which it is based. The literature on
optimal income taxation relies on the labor-leisure framework, in which households
are assumed to derive utility from the consumption of market goods and time,
separately. However, since the work of Becker (1965) it has been recognized that
goods and time are not themselves carriers of utility but are rather inputs into
a process which generates household activities or commodities. In other words,
households derive utility from diﬀerent combinations of goods and time, and there
is no such thing as pure leisure. For example, watching a movie requires not only
the moviegoer’s time but also the purchase of transportation, tickets, etc. One may
t h i n ko ft h i sa sat h e o r yo fc o n s u m p t i o nt echnology or as a theory of household
production, although it does not deal with production activities in the common
sense of the term.
Our paper builds upon the Becker (1965) framework, extended to allow for the
1presence of two members of each household. In this framework, the taxation of
labor income distorts behavior in two ways. First, income taxation lowers shadow
wages within the household, inducing a substitution away from goods intensive
activities towards time intensive activities. As a result, more time is spent in the
household and less time in the market, consistent with the labor-leisure distortion
in a standard model. Second, if the income tax system involves diﬀerential rates
for the husband and wife, it aﬀects the relative shadow wage in the family. This
creates a distortion in the primary-secondary input ratio in household activities. In
other words, income taxation may involve a composition eﬀe c to nn o n - m a r k e tt i m e ,
in addition to the more traditional level eﬀect. The design of the tax system should
account for both of these distortions. We analyze whether this calls for individual or
joint income taxation, taking into account that governments also have commodity
taxes at their disposal.
Our ﬁrst result is that in the absence of restrictions in the use of commodity
taxes, joint ﬁling is optimal. The result applies even in the presence of diﬀerent
labor supply elasticities for primary and secondary earners. Although individual
taxation can be used to increase labor supply in this case, it is an ineﬃcient way to
deal with the distortion of time allocation in the Becker model. Since the distortion
against market time (labor supply) reﬂects a distortion of household activities, and
since these activities use market-produced goods, we may take care of the labor
supply distortion directly through the use of selective commodity taxation. Once
the optimal commodity tax system is in place, the income tax system should avoid
distorting the time inputs of the two spouses in household activities. This requires
identical marginal tax rates for the husband and wife, which is achieved by joint
income taxation.
This implies that the case for individual taxation should be sought in the pres-
ence of non-optimal commodity taxes. This is of course quite realistic. In practice,
there are important restrictions on the implementation of optimal commodity taxes
resulting from administrative costs, lack of information, and political ineﬃciencies.
Our second result deals with the case of such restrictions. Now the income tax
2should try to compensate for the erroneous commodity taxes. We show that the
ability of individual income taxation to do so requires a systematic relationship
between the primary-secondary input ratio and the activities which are taxed too
little or too much. In particular, if the time of primary earners are used predomi-
nantly in those activities which are favored by commodity taxes, we should impose
a relatively low tax rate on primary earners, and vice versa. On the other hand, if
there is no such correlation it is still optimal to employ joint taxation. In any case,
the optimal income tax system depends on the nature of the restrictions on com-
modity taxes, not the magnitude of labor supply elasticities. There is no general
presumption in favor of a higher tax rate on the income of primary earners.
The paper is related to the study of Piggott and Whalley (1996) who were ﬁrst
to point out that individual-based taxation distorts input ratios in household pro-
duction. Using a general equilibrium model calibrated to Australian data, they
showed that the costs of the household production distortion can outweigh the ben-
eﬁts from setting diﬀerent tax rates on spouses to reﬂect labor supply elasticities.
Hence, welfare gains can occur under switches from individual to joint income tax-
ation. But as pointed out by Apps and Rees (1999a) and Gottfried and Richter
(1999), it is important to keep in mind that Piggott and Whalley were comparing
joint taxation to an existing tax structure, which involved individual-based but in-
optimal income tax rates. Even in the Piggott-Whalley setup, joint taxation is an
unlikely candidate for the optimal tax system.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we wish to study the sen-
sitivity of results to the speciﬁcation of household production. While the existing
analyses rest on the simpliﬁed Gronau (1973, 1977) setup — retaining the assump-
tion of pure leisure as a utility yielding commodity — we adopt instead the Becker
framework. As suggested above, we ﬁnd that the chosen speciﬁcation can be cru-
cial for the policy conclusions. Second, we study the relation between the choice
of tax unit and the presence of administrative or other restrictions giving rise to
non-optimal commodity taxes. Implicitly, since the previous models operated with
just one market-produced consumption good, they studied the issue under an as-
3sumption of optimal commodity taxation. We show that restrictions on commodity
taxation are important, because the income tax then needs to account for distortions
in commodity demand, in addition to d i s t o r t i o n si nt i m ea l l o c a t i o n .
Before proceeding to the theoretical analysis, a few comments about its limi-
tations are warranted. Like the previous papers on this topic, we consider only
linear taxation of couples. This makes the problem formally identical to a Ramsey
optimal tax problem, simplifying the analysis a great deal. However, because of
the linearity assumption, the income tax system is eﬀectively an individual-based
tax, although gender/spouse speciﬁc. By implication, the issue in this literature
is really one of uniform versus diﬀerentiated marginal tax rates on spouses, rather
than the more complex issue of individual versus joint tax treatment. In general, a
j o i n ti n c o m et a xi so n ew i t ha ni n t e r - d e p e n d e n c eb e t w e e nt h et a xp a y m e n to fo n e
earner and the earnings of his/her spouse. One could in fact incorporate selective
income tax rates in a framework of joint ﬁling, just as one can have identical mar-
ginal tax rates with individual-based taxation. Despite these considerations, the
present paper adopts the conventional terminology that individual-based taxation
corresponds to diﬀerentiated tax rates, whereas joint taxation involves uniform tax
rates. For an analysis of a fully general non-linear income tax for couples, we refer
to Kleven et al. (2004).
Our analysis does not incorporate distributional concerns. The purpose here is
not to characterize optimal redistribution, but simply to reconsider the eﬃciency ar-
gument for individual-based taxation. Before making ﬁrm policy recommendation,
one should of course consider that the choice of tax unit raises issues pertaining
to distribution both across families and across spouses within families. Kleven et
al. (2004) presents a comprehensive study of optimal inter-family redistribution,
while Apps and Rees (1999b) incorporate both intra- and inter-family distributional
concerns into their analysis.
Since we do not wish to study intra-household distribution in this paper, we
adopt the standard household utility function approach regarding the family as an
income pooling unit. Hence, our model is formally equivalent to a single decision
4maker optimizing labor supply along two dimensions, and there is no conﬂict about
decisions within the family. This is in contrast to the recent collective labor supply
literature following Chiappori (1992), modelling the couple as two separate utility-
maximizing individuals interacting with each other. We adopt the household utility
function approach because of its simplicity, and because the Boskin-Sheshinski ef-
ﬁciency argument for individual taxation was based on this framework.
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section sets up the model
of household production, while Section 3 shows that the fully optimized tax system
involves joint taxation. Section 4 analyses optimal income taxation with restric-
tions on the use of commodity taxes, while Section 5 discusses the speciﬁcation
of household production functions. Section 6 investigates the role of labor supply
elasticities for our results and, ﬁnally, Section 7 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
The representative family obtains utility by combining market-produced goods,
X1,X2,...,Xn, and household time, L1,L 2,...,L n so as to obtain commodities/activities,













,i =1 ,...,n, (1)
where the f-function exhibits constant returns to scale.1 This basic setting is iden-
tical to the original Becker (1965) framework except that Li, rather than being the
input of one individual, is treated as a composite input due to the presence of two










,i =1 ,...,n, (2)
where g(·) features constant returns to scale and where Li
P and Li
S are the time
inputs of the two household members, whom we will refer to as a primary (P)a n d
1More generally, we may think of Xi as a composite input incorporating many diﬀerent market-
produced goods. It is possible that some of these market-produced goods enter more than one
household activity. The only substantive assumption needed for our purpose is the feasibility of
selective taxation across diﬀerent Xi’s.
5a secondary (S) earner, respectively. The formulation includes the case where some
activities use the time input of one household member only.





i − WPNP − NS ≤ 0, (3)
where NP and NS denote labor supply to the market of the primary and the sec-
ondary earner, respectively, while Pi is the consumer price of good i and WP is the
consumer wage of the primary worker. The consumer wage of the secondary worker
is normalized to one (WS =1 ). Taxes are introduced by deﬁning Pi ≡ pi + τiPi
and WP ≡ wP − τPWP, where small letters refer to producer prices and wages,
and where tax rates, τi and τP, are measured in proportion of after-tax prices and
wages.
Since there is no lump sum income in eq. (3), two tax systems are equivalent
if they diﬀer only by a proportional tax on all commodities X1,...,Xn,N P,N S
(the budget constraint is homogeneous of degree zero in prices). Therefore, we
gain an additional free normalization, and we set the tax rate on the secondary
earner’s income equal to zero (i.e. WS = wS =1 ). The tax rate τP should then
be interpreted as the excess marginal tax rate on the primary earner’s income, and
τP =0corresponds to joint income taxation. In the interpretation of the results
derived below, it will be important to keep in mind that this is just a normalization,
not a restriction. The real restriction lies in the assumption, implicit in eq. (3), that
only market purchases are taxable, while household time is not. This corresponds
exactly to the assumption made in the standard framework that labor is taxable
while leisure is not.2










P + NP =1 , (4)
2More generally, the restriction on the tax system — in our model as in the standard model
— is that we cannot tax the consumption of any endowed commodity separately from it own
endowment. See Auerbach (1985) for a very clear discussion of the subtle distinction between
restrictions and normalizations in optimal taxation.
6w h e r et h et o t a lt i m ea v a i l a b l ei sn o r m a l i z e dt oo n e .
We solve the dual consumer problem by minimizing the LHS of (3) subject to
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S (WP) ˜ L
i, (7)
where a tilde refers to compensated demand or supply, xi and li are the inputs of
goods and labor, respectively, per unit of commodity i,w h i l eli
P and li
S are the time
uses of primary and secondary earners per unit of labor in activity i.T h es o l u t i o n
depends on unit costs in household activities, Q =( Q1,...,Qn),a sw e l la sw a g e



























For later use, note that the expenditure function may be derived by inserting eqs










i − WP − 1. (10)
Becker’s (1965) paper and the subsequent applications of his framework (e.g.
Atkinson and Stern, 1980, 1981; Kleven, 2004) focused on the case of a ﬁxed coeﬃ-
cients (Leontieﬀ) consumption technology, i.e., xi (Pi,Wi) ≡ xi and li (Pi,Wi) ≡ li.
Initially, we focus on this case too, but in Section 5 we consider the implications
of allowing for substitution between goods and time in each activity. It should be
noticed, however, that the assumption of ﬁxed coeﬃcients does not have to rule out
the possibility of substitution in household production. Basic to the notion of any
production function is the existence of diﬀerent production processes, where each
process uses a certain ﬁxed ratio of inputs. A production function, in other words,
is a description of substitution possibilities between production processes. In this
7interpretation, we may think of the Z commodities as production processes, while
the U function captures the possibilities for substitution between these processes.3
Moreover, under the ﬁxed coeﬃcients consumption technology, the eﬀects of tax-
ation on behavior are comparable to the eﬀects discussed in the literature. Taxes
aﬀect behavior in two ways. Firstly, commodity and labor taxes induce a substitu-
tion away from goods intensive activities tow a r d st i m ei n t e n s i v ea c t i v i t i e s ,t h e r e b y
reducing the supply of labor to the market. This is analogous to the labor-leisure
distortion of the Boskin-Sheshinski approach. Secondly, diﬀerent marginal tax rates
on the two household members aﬀect the primary-secondary labor input mix in each
household activity, corresponding to the eﬀect introduced by the Piggott-Whalley
contribution. Thus, the assumption of ﬁxed coeﬃcients retains the tax eﬀects em-
phasized in the previous papers. Moreover, our framework is suﬃciently general to
encompass these studies as special cases.4
3O p t i m a l T a x a t i o n
To derive the optimal tax system, we deﬁne the dead-weight burden of taxation as











P,W P, ¯ U
¢
, (11)
where q =( q1,...,qn) denotes the vector of unit costs in the absence of taxation,
P =( P1,...,P n) is the vector of consumer prices, ¯ U is the after tax utility level,
3For example, dish-washing may be carried out by the use of a brush or a machine. These two
production processes involve ﬁxed (but diﬀerent) ratios between time and market goods. Washing
up with a brush and a machine, respectively, are then modelled as two diﬀerent Z commodities,
while the substitution between them lies in the U function. Besides this substitution between
production processes involving diﬀerent proportions of goods and time, there is the possibility of
substitution between the wife’s and the husband’s time (either one can do the dishes or they can
do it together). This type of substitution is modelled in the gi (·) function in eq. (2).
4This is easily seen by considering the following examples: For n =3and l1 = x2 = l2
S =
x3 = l3






, such that the framework corresponds
to Boskin and Sheshinski (1983). For n =4and l1 = x2 = x3 = l3
S = x4 = l4
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and Whalley (1996).
8while T (·) is the total tax revenue deﬁned as
T
¡









i +( wP − WP) ˜ NP.
By inserting eqs (4) - (9), the tax revenue becomes
T
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Given the usual assumption of linear production technology in the market sector, the
optimal tax system may be found by minimizing D with respect to consumer prices,
P, and wages, WP, subject to an exogenous revenue requirement, T
¡
P,W P, ¯ U
¢
≥
¯ T. By solving this problem and letting αi
X ≡ xiPi/Qi denote the cost share for
market-produced goods in the production of commodity i,w eo b t a i n
Proposition 1 If goods shares are positive in all activities, αi
X > 0 ∀i,t h e nt h e
optimal tax system is characterized by joint taxation, τP =0 ,a n dc o m m o d i t yt a x




Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, when all utility yielding commodities require the input of market goods
it is more eﬃcient to have joint than individual ﬁling.5 To grasp the intuition,
consider a situation with a uniform commodity tax and a joint (uniform) income tax.
The presence of commodity taxation (increasing goods prices) and income taxation
(lowering shadow wages) distort relative unit costs in household activities, Qi/Qj,b y
making goods intensive activities more expensive relative to time intensive activities.
This induces a substitution away from goods intensive activities, thereby reducing
the supply of labor to the market. Now, rather than using selective income taxation
to deal with this distortion, it is better to employ selective commodity taxation. In
5As explained previously, since the tax system is deﬁned only up to a proportional factor, we
may normalize the tax rate on the secondary earner’s income to zero. Accordingly, Proposition 1
does not state that income tax rates should be zero, but that income tax rates should be identical
for the primary and the secondary earner. As always in optimal taxation, there is a multitude of
optima, each of them characterized by the same relative structure but diﬀerent tax levels. One of
these optima involve zero income taxation for both husband and wife, while others involve positive
(or negative) tax rates on both partners.
9particular, by imposing higher tax rates on goods that are used in time intensive
activities, as reﬂected by the rule in Proposition 1, we keep relative unit costs
unchanged, whereby distortions between household activities are avoided altogether.
With an undistorted pattern of household activities, there is also no distortion of
labor supply. In this situation, the use of individual income taxation, by changing
relative shadow wages, merely creates a household production ineﬃciency, which
could be avoided by the use of joint taxation.6
At ﬁrst glance, our result seems to resemble the production eﬃciency theorem of
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) stating that the optimal tax system retains production
eﬃciency in the market sector, as long as there are no privately received economic
proﬁts and provided that there are no restrictions on the use commodity taxes.
Analogously, our result shows that, once the optimal commodity tax system is in
place, we do not wish to introduce production ineﬃciencies within the household
sector. There is a fundamental diﬀerence between the two propositions, however,
in that the Diamond-Mirrlees result is a statement about a second-best tax system,
w h i l ew eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed a ﬁrst-best optimal tax system.
The assumption in Proposition 1 that the optimal commodity tax structure can
be implemented is a critical one. With non-optimal commodity taxes there will be
distortions in the pattern of household activities, which in turn implies a distortion
of labor supply. In this case one might want to introduce selective individual income
taxation to alleviate this labor supply distortion. The next section looks into this
matter.
4 Restrictions on the use of Commodity Taxes
In practise, the use of optimal commodity taxes is obstructed by the presence of ad-
ministrative costs, imperfect information, and political ineﬃciencies. In fact, such
constraints could be even more important in our context than usual because of
the production process interpretation discussed in Section 2. In this interpretation,
6For a more elaborate discussion of optimal commodity taxation in the Becker framework see
Kleven (2004).
10there would be a large number of activities in the utility function and hence a large
number of diﬀerent commodity tax rates. This is not likely to be implementable.
For example, one would imagine that the tax rate is restricted to be uniform within
certain groups of commodities. Alternatively, some market goods might be un-
taxable, implying that the activities using these goods also become untaxed. We
now wish to explore the consequences of these and other restrictions on the use of
commodity taxes for the optimal tax treatment of the family.
For this purpose, we consider some exogenously given commodity tax structure
{τi}
n
i=1. In this tax structure, all goods might be taxed non-optimally. More gen-
erally, a number of goods, say m, could be taxed optimally, while the tax rates
on the remaining n − m goods are set to some suboptimal levels. For this given
non-optimal commodity tax structure, we now ask whether it is possible to improve
welfare through a marginal restructuring of the tax system which introduces diﬀer-
ent marginal tax rates on primary and secondary earners. Due to the equivalence
of a uniform commodity tax and a uniform income tax, we may examine the con-
sequence for welfare formally by, say, raising τP and making a uniform reduction of
the τi’s.
Let ηki ≡
∂ ˜ Zk/ ˜ Zk
∂Qi/Qi denote the elasticity of compensated demand for activity k
with respect to the unit cost in activity i. Then,
Proposition 2 Consider a tax system characterized by a given commodity tax
structure, {τi}
n
i=1, and joint taxation, τP =0 . This tax system may be improved by
























Proof. See Appendix B.
Note ﬁrst that if all commodity taxes are at their ﬁrst-best levels then, as in




for all i,j since
Pn
i=1 ηki =0due to homogeneity of degree zero of compensated
demands. When the commodity tax rates are not at their optimal levels individual
11taxation is typically optimal. However, the elements which determine the optimal
sign of τP are diﬀerent from the labor-leisure analyses and do not lead to a general
presumption in favor of a higher tax rate on primary earners.
To come to grips with Proposition 2, consider the special case where exactly one
market good is untaxable whereas the remaining commodities are taxed according






















Thus, we should impose a relatively low tax rate on the person used mainly in
combination with the untaxable good 1 as well as its complements. This rule reﬂects
that selective income taxation tries to compensate for the missing commodity tax
instrument. The speciﬁc restriction which we impose implies that activity 1 (and
complementary activities) are taxed too leniently. To counteract this distortion,
income taxation should be designed to raise shadow wages in these activities. This is
done through the imposition of low rates on the household member used intensively
in these activities.8
Going back to the general case in Proposition 2, we conclude that the person
used intensively in combination with market goods that are taxed too leniently,
relative to the rule in Proposition 1, should face the lowest marginal tax rate. On
the other hand, if there is no systematic correlation between time intensities and
t h ea c t i v i t i e sw h i c ha r et a x e dt ol e n i e n t l y ,s e l e c t i v ei n c o m et a x a t i o nc a n n o tb eu s e d
to compensate for ineﬃcient commodity taxation. In any case, whether the income
7Notice that this special case may alternatively be thought of as the situation with pure leisure.
For optimal taxation purposes, the case where one activity is pure leisure is equivalent to the case
where this activity uses market inputs which cannot be taxed. The substantive feature in both
cases is the presence of an untaxable activity. Clearly, the case of untaxable activities is interesting,
since in practice tax authorities may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to tax activities such as conversation with
friends, caring for an infant, etc. Notice ﬁnally that even in the case of one untaxable activity
(‘pure leisure’) our framework diﬀers from the labor-leisure framework, because the remaining
activities require both market goods and household time as inputs.
8The introduction of selective income taxation also generates a distortion in the relative time
use of the two partners in household production. However, this eﬀect is irrelevant for the optimal
sign of τP as it is only of second order when starting from a situation with identical rates.
12tax ought to favor the primary or the secondary earner (or none at all) depends in
the end on the nature of the administrative costs.
5 Substitution Between Market Goods and Time
So far, we have focused on the case of ﬁxed technological coeﬃcients for market
goods and time in household activities. This assumption has been made in previous
applications of the Becker framework, and it may be justiﬁed from a production
process interpretation of activities. However, as discussed in the previous section,
this justiﬁcation for the Leontieﬀ speciﬁcation makes the incorporation of restricted
commodity taxation more urgent than usual. Hence, an alternative to introducing
restricted commodity taxation would be to drop the ﬁxed coeﬃcients speciﬁcation.
In this section, we generalize the analysis to account for substitution between market
goods and time as well as restricted commodity taxation.
Let σk
Z denote the (numerical) elasticity of substitution between time and market
goods in activity k. Then Proposition 2 generalizes to
Proposition 3 Consider a tax system characterized by a given commodity tax
structure, {τi}
n
i=1, and joint taxation, τP =0 . This tax system may be improved by





























Proof. See Appendix B.
The last term in the second parenthesis is new. The new term reﬂects that the
commodity tax system creates an incentive for the family to substitute non-taxed
time for taxed market goods in household activities. The distortionary eﬀect is
particular large in activities with a high degree of substitution between market goods
and time and in activities with large goods shares. Now, if these activities mainly
use primary labor then it is possible to counteract the distortion by increasing the
opportunity cost of using primary labor in the home. In this case, the couples
should face a selective tax system with the lowest rate on the primary earner.
13Proposition 3 considers a given commodity tax structure. We now turn to the
case where commodity taxes are set optimally. Because of the substitutability
between market goods and time in household production, the optimal tax rule is
considerably more complicated than in Proposition 1. In order to simplify the
analysis and focus entirely on the new eﬀects, we disregard substitution between
activities, i.e. ηki =0∀k,i. We then derive the optimal commodity tax structure





















Interestingly, this equation shows that the optimization of the commodity tax sys-
tem removes the importance of substitution elasticities for the sign of τp.O n l y
factor shares matter for the eﬃcient diﬀerentiation of income tax rates. In partic-
ular, the tax system should favor the spouse used mostly in activities requiring a
high share of market produced goods.
6 The Role of Labor Supply Elasticities
According to the standard reasoning, a selective income tax favoring the secondary
earner is good for eﬃciency because it exploits that the (compensated) labor supply
of secondary earners is relatively elastic. In the context of our model, it is natural to
ask if this empirical observation still provides an argument for choosing individual
taxation.
To address this question, we derive the (compensated) labor supply elasticity
of the two household members. For the primary worker, the elasticity equals (see
Appendix D)



































L denotes the elasticity of substitution between the time uses for the husband
and wife in activity k, σk
Z denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods and
time in activity k, αk
L denotes the cost share for labor in activity k,w h i l eαk
P denotes
14the share of labor costs attributed to the primary earner. The corresponding labor
supply elasticity for the secondary earner may be found by substituting S for P in
the respective subscripts. Equation (15) shows that a wage increase for the primary
earner raises his/her labor supply by inducing a substitution from primary earner
time to secondary earner time in each household activity (ﬁrst component in the
bracket), by inducing a substitution from time to market goods in each activity
(second component in the bracket), and by inducing a substitution away from the
activities using a lot of primary time (third component in the bracket).
A comparison of equation (15) and the condition in Proposition 3 shows that
knowledge of labor supply elasticities alone is insuﬃcient to determine whether
selective income taxation should favor secondary earners. The observed diﬀerence
in labor supply elasticities may for example be due to diﬀerent shares in labor
costs (αi
P and αi
S), but these parameters do not enter the condition provided by
Proposition 3. Therefore, economic eﬃciency may, at least in principle, call for the
lowest tax rate on primary earners although their labor supply is relatively inelastic.
7C o n c l u s i o n
According to the conventional view, individual taxation is more eﬃcient than joint
taxation because the labor supply of secondary earners is more elastic than that
of primary earners. However, this proposition relies on the labor-leisure model,
which does not take into account that utility-yielding commodities take the form of
a c t i v i t i e su s i n gt h ei n p u to fb o t hg o o d sa n dt i m e .O n c ew er e c o g n i z et h i sf e a t u r e
of household behavior, it turns out that selective commodity taxation, rather than
selective income taxation, may be the best instrument to deal with the distortion
of labor supply. Indeed, in the absence of restrictions on the use of commodity
taxes, joint income taxation is optimal. With restrictions on the use of commodity
taxes individual taxation is typically optimal, although not in the usual way. The
income tax should try to compensate for the missing instruments and, consequently,
the diﬀerentiation of tax rates between primary and secondary earners depends on
15the nature of administrative costs. In particular, there is no obvious relationship
with labor supply elasticities and it may be optimal to favor primary earners even
if their labor supply is relatively inelastic. Thus, the eﬃciency argument in favor
of individual taxation with high marginal rates on primary earners may be more
fragile than previously thought.
An issue not touched upon in our analysis is the adverse eﬀect of joint taxation
on marriage decisions. In a progressive tax system, the tax liability of two un-
married people living together is generally diﬀerent from that of a married couple
ﬁling jointly. Couples may face marriage subsidies or marriage penalties, depend-
ing on the distribution of income between spouses and on the construction of rate
schedules. This may lead to distortions in marriage decisions, see e.g. Alm and
Whittington (1997, 1999).
Finally, it should be emphasized that the analysis has focused exclusively on
eﬃciency, although the choice of tax unit may have important distributional impli-
cations as well. In particular, the tax treatment of couples raises issues pertaining
to both intra-family distribution (Apps and Rees, 1999b) and inter-family distrib-
ution (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2004). Before drawing ﬁrm policy conclusions,
one should of course account for such eﬀects.
A Proof of Proposition 1










∂Pj j =1 ,...,n.





































˜ Zjxj ,j =1 ,...,n, (16)
i.e., marginal revenue in proportion of tax bases must be equal for all taxes.
























































































































Joint taxation is characterized by τP =0 . Thus, joint taxation is optimal if there
exists {τi}
n
























w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h es y m m e t r yo ft h eS l u t s k ym a t r i x . U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition
αi


























i =0 ,j =1 ,...,n.




∂QiQi =0 ,i ti sn o w




X for i,j =1 ,...,n.T h u s ,t h e s ef o r m u l a ea n dτP =0characterize a solution
to the optimal tax problem.
17B Proof of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
Proposition 3 generalizes Proposition 2 by including substitution eﬀects between
goods and time in home production. A proofo fP r o p o s i t i o n3i st h e r e f o r ea l s oa
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
For a given initial commodity tax structure {τi}
n
i=1, we consider the eﬀect on
the dead-weight loss of a marginal increase in τP and a corresponding reduction
in a value-added tax rate, τ, which keeps the tax revenue constant. The value-
added tax is proportional to producer prices, giving rise to consumer prices Pi =
pi (1 + τ)/(1 − τi).T h e e ﬀect on the dead-weight loss of a marginal change in










where dτ/dτP i st h ec h a n g ei nτ which keeps the tax revenue ﬁxed. From T (τ,τP)=


























































where the last equalities in the two expressions follow from ∂e/∂Qj = ˜ Zj, Shep-
hard’s Lemma, ∂Pi/∂τ = pi/(1 − τi),a n d∂WP/∂τP = −WP. Inserting these
expressions in Ψ(τP,τ) gives









On the presumption that ∂T/∂τ > 0, i.e. the economy is on the upward-sloping
part of the Laﬀer curve, it follows that Ψ(0,0) > 0 if
∂T (0,0)
∂τ








j > 0. (17)





















































PWP + WP ˜ NP,
where we have used Shephard’s Lemma, ∂Pi/∂τ = Pi, Pi − pi = τiPi,a n d
∂WP/∂τP = −WP. After using symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, ∂ ˜ Zi/∂Qk =
∂ ˜ Zk/∂Qi, as well as the relationships li
Pli ˜ Zi = ˜ Li
P, xi ˜ Zi = ˜ Xi, αi
X ≡ Pixi/Qi,a n d
Wili/Qi =1− αi





















































∂Wi/WiWP + WP ˜ NP.
In these two expressions, we substitute ηki ≡
∂ ˜ Zk/ ˜ Zk
∂Qi/Qi ,
∂xi/xi




∂Wi/W i =( 1− αi
X)σi
Z where σk
Z denotes the (numerical) elasticity of substitution
























































ZWP + WP ˜ NP.
































Qi ˜ Zi − Pi ˜ Xi
Pn
j=1 Pj ˜ Xj
!
> 0,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition of αi
X in order to obtain the expression in the














Qk ˜ Zk − WP ˜ Lk
P − WS˜ Lk
S















P + WS˜ Li
S
WP ˜ NP + WS ˜ NS
!#
> 0
19which, after multiplying by
³











































Symmetry of the Slutsky matrix and homogeneity of degree zero of the compensated















































T h u s ,as m a l li n c r e a s ei nτP and a corresponding reduction in τ increase the dead-
weight loss if this inequality is fulﬁlled, and vice versa. Proposition 2 arises as the
special case where σk
Z =0∀k.
CD e r i v a t i o n o f e q . ( 1 4 )













n,W P, ¯ U
¢
≥ ¯ T,
where D(·) is the dead-weight burden of taxation while T (·) denotes government
revenue. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
∂D/∂Pk
∂T/∂Pk = µk =1 ,...,n,
where µ is the shadow price associated with the government budget constraint.













This relationship is substituted into the above optimality conditions, which gives
˜ Zkxk
∂T/∂Pk =1+µ.
20From eq. (12), the deﬁnition of the tax rates, and the assumption of no substitution











w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dS h e p h a r d ’ sL e m m a . I n s e r t i o no ft h i sd e r i v a t i v ei nt h ea b o v e












w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dPk−pk = τkPk, αk
X ≡ Pkxk/Qk,a n d
∂xk/xk







Finally, by combining this expression with Proposition 3 and the assumption ηki =
0,w eo b t a i ne q .( 1 4 ) .
DD e r i v a t i o n o f E q . ( 1 5 )




























































































where the last equality follows from Shepard’s Lemma and ˜ Lk
P = lk
Plk ˜ Zk.N o w ,t h e
labor supply elasticity may be written as
























































L,a n dηki =
∂ ˜ Zk/ ˜ Zk
∂Qi/Qi ,w eo b t a i ne q .( 1 5 ) .
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